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I shall begin with the assumption that there are, among our mental acts. some which stand 
in direct contact with ohjects in the material world. The aim of this paper will he to clarify 
and to draw out certain implications of this somewhat trivial assumption, and ultimately to 
say something about the ontological structure of those of our acts which effect the function 
of bringing us into contact with material acts which serve. as we might say, as the 
iiuf3ersten Punkte des Bewuf3tseins, die die zu erfassenden Gegensliinde beruhren. 
Amongst material objects I shall include not only material things such as tables and per-
sons, but also for example masses of stuff, individual moments of things and stuffs (including 
acts themselves, processes, etc. )-and parts and aggregates of objects of all of these 
kinds. I 
The realist here defended was shared by Wittgenstein and by the Husserl of the 
Logische Untersuchungen. It can be contrasted with various forms of idealism which would 
either deny any possibility of our acts bringing us into contact with what is external, or 
restrict the range of such contact to a thin sliver of residual surface-phenomena ('sense data', 
'Empfindungen', etc.). It conflicts also, though less radically, with representationalism, 
which asserts that even in the most favourable of circumstances an act can serve at best as 
internal copy or image of its object. 
The acts which serve as the most obvious candidates for bringing us into contact with real 
material objects are of course acts of perception, and applied to perceptual acts the realist 
thesis may be formulated as follows: the broad mass of those of our acts which, as they occur, 
are experienced as perceivings, do in fact bring us into contact with material objects. The 
exc:eotiolns are provided by certain kinds of strictly hallucinatory phenomena such as might 
occur on the edge of sleep. A strictly hallucinatory act, as I shall understand this term, corre-
sponds to no external object whatsoever, even though, whilst it is occurring, we are unable 
to differentiate it from a perceptual act. 
For our present purposes it will be useful to concentrate particularly upon the category of 
material-object-giving acts, i.e. of acts which are given as presenting or as being directed 
towards material objects. (Acts which bring us into contact with material objects will be seen 
to constitute a special case of material-object-giving acts.) Outside this category will fall 
those acts which are given as being directed towards objects or purported objects of other 
kinds (numbers, propositions, concepts, universals, and so on), and also acts-for example 
acts of will, or reflexive acts-which are not object-giving in any sense, or which involve acts 
which are not object-giving. Whilst in the present paper I shall be concerned only periphe-
rally with acts of these latter varieties, I do not deny that the standpoint here defined will 
face difficult problems when extended to such acts. 
The notion expressed by the term 'material-object-giving' is recognisably an approxima-
tion to the more familiar notion of intentionality. An act is intentional, it is said, which is 
directed towards an object-whereby it is left unsaid whether the object in question does or 
does not exist. Here, however, our attentions are directed to the peculiarity of those of our 
acts which bring us into contact with the world, and hence these attentions must be focussed 
precisely upon the differences, amongst material-object-giving acts, between those which 
have and those which lack an object. We shall accordingly begin by dividing the category of 
material-object-giving acts into the two sub-categories of veridical and non-veridical. A 
material-object-giving act is veridical which corresponds to some real material object in the 
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world. A act is non-veridical which, whilst it seems to be directed 
In fact corresponds to nothing al all. 
Note that veridical and non-vendical acts are. as 
vendica! l~ In fhl' 
nature It ha, to with hOI' acts-are in the world, not V.ilh how 
are conceived to be by the experiencing subject, The status of non-veridicality can be 
gned at best only retrospectively or by some external observer, A hallucinatory act 
some moment of reflection. i.e. one that is such that the subject in question is aware that 
is hallucinating, must for this reason be excluded from the category of material-object'giving 
acts as here conceived: the distinction between reflexive and non-reflexive acts, too, is an 
ontological but it is not purely ontological. since it is marked phenomenologi, 
callv. 
P~eciscly because veridical and non-veridical acts. as they occur, are phenomenologically 
indistinguishable, the treatment of intentionality in the phenomenologically inspired litera, 
ture has tended to ignore their peculiarities.: The phenomenologist does of 
course embrace some correlate of the between veridical and non-veridical, but he 
is unable to penetrate to the foundations of this distinction. He concentrates upon certain 
associated distinctions amongst sequences of acts in which 'empty' or signitive contents 
become verified or falsified through acts which are relatively 'full' (most typically acts of per-
ception), But whilst the phenomenologist is looking in the right place-among the structures 
of acts and act-complexes- his purely immanent account ultimately by'passes the veridical! 
non-veridical distinction because it makes no reference at all to transcendent objects (as is to 
be expected, of course, from a philosophy which would put the world into brackets). The 
phenomenologist can capture only those distinctions amongst acts that are made effective 
within the cumulative flow of evidence-gatherings and evidence-cancellings which makes up 
consciousness as immanently conceived, 
What, then, is the peculiarity of veridical acts? This question will remain ambiguous as 
long as it has not been made clear what is meant by the phrase 'corresponds to an object' 
occurring in the definition of veridicality, We can uncover a first ambiguity in this phrase by 
contrasting it with the realist's notion of an act's standing in direct contact with a material 
object, As already pointed out, the most obvious examples of acts in which such contact is 
established are acts of perception. Note, however, that when it is said of such an act that it 
'corresponds to an object', this need not in every case imply that the act in question brings 
its subject into contact with precisely that object with which, as it occurs, the subject in ques-
tion supposes he is in contact. Thus when, after a hard day walking through a desert land-
scape, I have the illusion that I am perceiving an oasis, my perceptual act brings me into 
contact not with an oasis but with a highly complex aggregate of sand and moving air-mole-
cules. When I mistake a distant boulder for a cow, my perceptual act brings me into contact 
with the boulder, even though I suppose, mistakenly, that I am in contact with a cow. (My 
act is then, as Twardowski might say, characterised as having a bovine content,) 
We shall employ the term relational to designate the category of acts which bring us into 
direct contact ~ith material objects. Relational acts are, like other varieties of acts, real 
material objects in their own right. But they have a quite peculiar, i.e. precisely relational, 
form. Like individual relations of other kinds they serve to connect material objects one to 
another: here, to connect persons with the material objects of which they are conscious. The 
notion of a real material relation, current amongst the realist scholastics, has nowadays gone 
somewhat out of favour. Yet many familiar examples can be provided: individual relations 
of magnetic attraction, hits, kisses, contracts, promises, conversations, and so on. Real 
material relations are distinguished from other, non-relational material objects which do the 
job of tying things together-pieces of string, masses of glue, cartilaginous bands-by the fact 
that, as a matter of necessity, they cannot exist in separation from the objects which they 
connect. 
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fect match (vollkommene Deckung) between content and object. A non·covering relational 
act is one which brings us into contact with some object, but which is characterised by the 
fact that there is some relevant mis-match between its content and this object. This distinc-
tion is provisional only: in a more adequate account, which would presuppose an analysis of 
the kind of contents which (material-object-giving) acts may possess, the simple opposition 
between covering and non-covering would have to way to a complex spectrum of diffe-
rent kinds of cases. Alreadv, however, we can see that the status of H:ridicality can be assi-
gned to non-covering relational acts only with caution, For whilst such acts are veridical in 
the sense of our definition~they to some real material object.~it must be borne 
in mind that the object in is not the right object from the point of view of the expe-
riencing subject, 
The distinctions between relational and non-relational and between covering and non-
covering acts are, once more, ontological in nature: they correspond to nothing of which the 
subject in question is aware whilst his act is occurring, Relational acts are acts which bring us 
into direct content with objects in the material world, but we are not specifically aware that 
such contact has been established, for we impute the character of relationality as a matter of 
course to all our (non-reflexive, material-object-giving) acts, And thus also we often mista-
kenly suppose that relational contact has been established where in reality it has not. An 
object-giving act thus fails to be relational in one of two ways, It may be simply non-veridi-
cal: may correspond to no object at aIL Or it may correspond to an object (because its con-
tent meets certain conditions), yet fail to bring its subject into real relational contact with 
that object. An example here would be, for example, the case of the detective X who is at 
some moment thinking about the murderer Yof Z This act does not bring X into direct con-
tact with Ybecause, as we shall suppose, X does not yet know who Yis, Yet still this act may 
correctly be said to correspond to an object (i.e, under the assumption that there is just one 
murderer of Z), Amongst veridical non-relational acts of this and associated types there is 
no opposition such as that between covering and non-covering amongst relational acts, since 
here the function of 'corresponding to an object' is exercised entirely by the content of the 
act, and therefore any mis-match between content and object must automatically render the 
act non-veridicaL 
This gives rise to a categorisation of material-object-giving acts somewhat as follows: 
~ material-object-giving-acts ~ 
relational non-relational 
~ ------ ~ '-...... 
covering non-covering covering I I non-covering 
I I 
veridical non-veridical 
We stress once more that there is no internal mark or criterion of any of the distinctions 
here portrayed, This is the case, in particular, in relation to the property of relationality, The 
detective may for example be in possession of a proper name or of a whole sequence of inde-
pendent, uniquely specifying descriptions of the murderer Y, yet still not be in relational 
contact with Y, still not know who Y is, in the relevant sense, Those philosophers who have 
sought to supply internal or epistemological criteria for what I have called relationality are 
therefore. I suggest, on the wrong track, Only an ontological account of the structures of 
acts, and of the relations between acts and objects. can do justice to oppositions of the type 
discussed in this paper," 
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1 This holds true also of the more recent semantic investigations of IOtentionality. for example In terms 
possible worlds. which have concentrated too narrowly upon the semantic properties of first-person 
reports of mental experience. ) I have developed some of these ideas further in my paper ~ Acta cum fundament!s in re«. forthcoming in 
Dialectica, 
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